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PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE DUTIES UNDER THE COMMON
EUROPEAN SALES LAW
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD*

1.

Introduction

When two merchants meet and begin to bargain, they are better off if there is
a sensible set of ground rules both understand. The rules ensure that the parties
know exactly what they are getting out of the deal and what they are obliged to
do. Difficulty can arise, however, in attempting to agree upon the background
rules, especially when the area customs of each of the merchants differ.
Indeed, the complications that accompany the setting up of ground rules is
often enough to cause parties to abandon the bargain completely. It was
because of this fact, and because of the differing rules between Member
States, that the European Commission saw fit to propose a Common European
Sales Law, with a goal of creating uniformity in the background rules of
contract law.1 The Commission’s hope was that this uniformity and
elimination of transaction costs would “improve the conditions for the
establishment and the functioning of the internal market.”2
Setting down sensible background rules is no easy task. Even rules that
seem entirely sensible prove problematic on close examination. One of the
new background rules in the CESL provides an illustration. Article 23 requires
sellers to make plain the basic attributes of what they are selling.3 The seller of
goods has a duty to disclose “any information concerning the main
characteristics of the goods . . . which [she] has or can be expected to have and
which it would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing not to disclose to the
other party.” Whether any particular information needs to be disclosed turns
on all the circumstances and these include such things as the special expertise
of the seller, the cost to the seller of acquiring the information, the nature of the
information, its importance to the buyer, and good commercial practice.
On the face of it, such a rule seems sound. A seller typically knows the
characteristics of the goods she is selling, this information is useful to the
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Common European Sales Law (“Proposal”), COM(2011)635 final, p. 2.
2. Art. 1(1) CESL.
3. For an analysis of this rule, see De Boeck, “B2B information duties in the feasibility
study: Analysis of Article 23”, 6 European Review of Private Law (ERPL) (2011), 787–797.
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buyer, and the seller can convey it at little cost. Most sellers would make such
disclosures. Indeed, reluctance to convey such basic information seems
suspect. With a disclosure rule in place, the buyer will know the main
characteristics of what she is buying without having to play a game of twenty
questions. This kind of disclosure rule increases transparency, decreases the
risk of advantage-taking, and makes parties more disposed to trade with one
another. And Article 23 is written in such a way that the duty exists only when
the disclosure is mutually beneficial. When the seller does not have the
information or the buyer does not need it or common intuitions about fairness
do not compel it, there is no disclosure duty.
This disclosure rule, especially in the way that it works in conjunction with
the merchant’s duty to abide by norms of good faith and fair dealing, is
entirely in the mainstream of the American commercial law tradition. The
Uniform Commercial Code was a remarkably successful effort to unify the
commercial law of fifty different jurisdictions. Its animating principle is that
one can look to the practices of merchants committed to principles of fair
dealing in the trade to establish the set of background rules that bind all
merchants.4 Article 23 works in the same way. The objective of the European
Commission in formulating the CESL was not necessarily to create a system
of revolutionary new laws, but to create uniformity among Member States in
order to remove transaction costs of cross-border trading.5 The disclosure
obligations of Article 23 are coextensive with the kinds of disclosures made by
merchants who conform to widely held norms. It is not unreasonable to expect
those who want to be a part of a commercial community to behave in this
fashion.
Or so runs an argument in favour of Article 23. It is, however, still prudent
to give it a hard look. Article 23’s disclosure obligation is new. Every legal rule
brings new costs. No rule can be applied perfectly. All lawyers recognize that
every legal rule imposes costs on innocent parties. Require a party to do x, and
in some cases even a party who in fact does x (and who might have done x even
in the absence of a legal rule) will be found liable for failing to do x some
percentage of the time. One must weigh the benefits of any rule, including
even an ostensibly sensible disclosure rule, against the costs that the come
with it.
In the context of Article 23, the benefits of the rule may be smaller than they
appear. Again, it is not the value of the disclosure itself, but rather the value
that comes from requiring disclosure. Much disclosure takes place in all
events. The benefits come only from the marginal disclosures the rule brings
4. See Danzig, “A comment on the jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code”, 27
Stanford Law Review (1975), 621–635, 624.
5. See Proposal, p. 2.
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about. And we need to understand the costs that such a requirement imposes
on everyone. We cannot assess the virtues of a rule without also knowing how
easy it will be to comply with it. And disclosure of the attributes of a product
is not as easy as revealing the combination to a safe. There is no ready
benchmark by which to tell that the disclosure is sufficient.
One cannot understand what work a rule is doing without seeing how it
works with the others around it. In the first part of this paper, I examine how
Article 23 works within the framework of commercial law generally and the
Common European Sales Law and commercial law more generally. In many
other contexts, we are reluctant to impose disclosure duties because they
distort the parties’ incentives to gather information in the first place. The
second part of the paper looks at what effects, if any, disclosing the main
characteristics of a product has on the seller’s behaviour. It is also commonly
asserted that disclosure duties are, by their nature, inherently hard to
implement. Requiring a party to disclose a particular piece of information in
a fashion that ensures that it is understood (and does not make communication
of other information harder) has proved difficult in many environments. The
third part of the paper asks if Article 23’s disclosure requirements present such
difficulties.
2.

The background

We should note at the outset that the domain over which Article 23 is likely to
change behaviour is a narrow one. Sellers have strong incentives to describe
the main characteristics of their products. Buyers want such information
before deciding to buy, and a seller who refuses to provide it to a buyer will
lose out to sellers who do. We should also expect disclosure even when the
market is not competitive. Buyers are suspicious of any seller who is unduly
coy about what she is selling. This uncertainty makes them more reluctant to
buy or pay as much, even from a monopolist. Buyers who do not know what
they are buying do not value goods as much as those that do. Even the
monopolist who fails to disclose will sell for a lower price and gain nothing in
return. It is not a question of imputing noble motives to anyone. Sellers who
keep their buyers in the dark leave money on the table. We should not expect
it to happen very often.
Most sellers adhere to norms of fair dealing in the trade, but the easiest way
to understand how something like a disclosure requirement works is to impute
bad motives to the seller. How exactly does a disclosure requirement constrain
a seller who wants to take advantage of her buyers? Assume that some buyers
do not know enough to ask the right questions or to discount for what they do
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not know. How can a seller bent upon mischief profit by remaining silent? We
cannot answer this question without first examining what opportunities for
mischief other legal rules leave open.
The disclosure requirement may do remarkably little work even in a legal
regime that does almost nothing for unsuspecting buyers. Consider the gap a
disclosure requirement might fill in a regime of caveat emptor. Legal regimes
that embraced caveat emptor have been outliers; we are speaking of only a few
jurisdictions and then mostly in the nineteenth century, and in these, the
application of caveat emptor was limited to middlemen and to a narrow range
of transactions.6 Here, the buyer tended to possess as much expertise as the
seller, the defects were visible, and the buyer was as well positioned to
discover the defect as the seller. But even caveat emptor offers little comfort to
those engaged in naked advantage-taking. The typical beneficiary was the
innocent seller who believed (wrongly as it turned out) that the wood she sold
was valuable braziletto wood rather than inferior peachum.7 It emphatically
did not protect a seller who lied and said that the wood was braziletto when she
knew the facts to be otherwise. I cannot say that my goods are of a particular
grade when I know them to be of a lesser grade.
There is room to argue over what counts as a misrepresentation. In some
environments, a seller can say that he promised his dying mother that he would
not sell a jewel for less than $20,000. To take a penny less would dishonour
him and his mother’s memory. He nevertheless accepts a counteroffer for
$17,500. It turns out that his mother, far from being dead, is in robust health
and has never heard of the jewel. Nevertheless, if the conversation took place
in a bazaar and was with another merchant there, it is quite possible that the
merchant did not lie. A statement is only a lie if the other merchant believed
him, and he did not. On the other hand, sometimes the prohibition against
lying is triggered even when I say nothing. I may make a misrepresentation
when I remain silent because new information has come to light that makes a
previous representation that I made misleading unless it is corrected.
Nevertheless, the basic requirement that the seller tell the truth limits a huge
amount of mischief.
As long as the seller describes the goods in any fashion, either in the
contract or in any negotiations leading up to it, the buyer can be confident that
the seller believes what she is saying to be true. Disclaimers and fine print are
ineffective when it comes to protecting the buyer from outright falsehoods and
gross misbehaviour. If a seller sells me something she calls braziletto, I can be
6. Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (Chicago, 1988),
pp. 269–298.
7. These are the facts of Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines Rep. 202 (N.Y. 1804), the canonical
caveat emptor case in American law.
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confident that she at least believes it to be braziletto. If she tells me that the
battery on the laptop has a six-hour life, she at least cannot believe it has only
a four-hour life.
Of course, much advantage-taking is more subtle than deliberate
misbehaviour. Moreover, it is easier to show that something is not true than it
is to show that the seller did not know it was not true. For this reason, most
commercial law regimes go considerably further than caveat emptor. Article
100 of the CESL requires a seller’s goods to pass without objection in the
trade.8 There is nothing particularly revolutionary in this rule. The lex
mercatoria required merchants to warrant that the goods they made pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description. This rule has
been in place since at least the fourteenth century and has been a consistent
feature of the law since then.9 Caveat emptor, even where it applied, left this
rule in place for the vast majority of sellers. It did not relieve manufacturers
from standing behind the goods they made.
In terms of ensuring that distant buyers are protected from
advantage-taking by their sellers, the implied warranty and the obligation to
tell the truth do much of the heavy lifting. When I sell you widgets, I am
promising you that my widgets pass without objection in the trade as widgets.
There is no need for a disclosure rule to prevent me from selling you
substandard goods. You do not need to know the major characteristics of the
goods to ensure that I am not taking gross advantage of you.
The Common European Sales Law also imposes an implied warranty of
fitness for any purpose made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion
of the contract.10 This rule gives the buyer no guarantee against surprises, but
it limits the amount of advantage taking that can take place. As long as I
warrant that my goods are suitable for the purposes you have made known to
me, I am not in a position to sell you goods when I know that they will not work
for you.
The interaction between voluntary disclosure and implied warranties
further constrains the potential for advantage-taking. Any description that I
make about what I am selling becomes a part of the bargain.11 When I run an
ad and announce that my products have particular characteristics, I am
8. See Art. 100 (b) CESL (requiring that the goods or digital content “be fit for the purposes
for which goods or digital content of the same description would ordinarily be used”).
9. See generally Trakman, “The evolution of the law merchant: Our commercial heritage,
part I: Ancient and medieval law merchant”, 12 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
(1980), 1–24.
10. See Art. 100 (a) CESL.
11. See Art. 69 CESL (“Where the trader makes a statement before the contract is
concluded . . . about the characteristics of what is to be supplied under the contract, the
statement is incorporated as a term of the contract.”); Art. 100 CESL (“The
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promising that my goods in fact possess those characteristics. In a regime in
which descriptions become part of the basis of the bargain, my description of
the goods also serves as a warranty. I sell a laptop computer. If I say nothing
about the battery life, then buyers only receive a warranty that the computer
has a battery that passes without objection in the trade. If I describe the battery
life, then this description becomes a promise to which I am bound and my
buyer will be able to hold me accountable if the battery life turns out to be
different.
Furthermore, the failure to disclose information about the goods in question
may already violate prohibitions of unfair competition provided by many
European Union Member States. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
prohibits both misleading actions and omissions to do with “the main
characteristics of the product.”12 It seems likely that this prohibition and its
corresponding penalties will take care of many of the issues the CESL’s
disclosure rule is attempting to address.
Under the Common European Sales Law and under most commercial law
regimes, the background rules are such that the buyer has already implicitly
asked “Do the goods you are selling me pass without objection in the trade and
are they suitable for my purposes,” and the seller has told her that they do. To
identify the work that the disclosure rule is doing, it is necessary to ask what
room is left for mischief even if no further questions are asked. What room is
there for me to take advantage of you when I am already obliged to sell you
goods that pass without objection in the trade and are suitable for your
purposes?
Even if we posit that a seller with impure motives has secrets, it is not
obvious that the secrets the buyer cares about concern the characteristics of the
goods being sold. There is no general duty to disclose information, but US
common law jurisdictions in recent years have required disclosure when one
party to the transaction knows that disclosure “would correct a mistake of the
other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract
and if nondisclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”13 To the extent that we
can extrapolate much from the cases that are litigated under this rule, the
evidence suggests that the sort of secrets that lead to advantage taking tend not
to be about attributes of the product, but rather about the surrounding
circumstances.
goods . . . must . . . possess the qualities and performance capabilities indicated in any
precontractual statement which forms part of the contract terms by virtue of Article 69.”)
12. See Art. 6 (1) (b) and Art. 7 (4) (a) of Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC of
11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, O.J. 2005, L
149/22.
13. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §161(b).
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The owner of a building brings in a second contractor to repair the mistakes
of a previous one and fails to disclose a number of defects that are not readily
observable that will make the job much more costly than it first appears.14 I
approach you to buy tobacco. I know that the War of 1812 is over and that the
price of tobacco will rise and do not disclose this information to you.15 I have
a storeroom by the ocean that I have converted to an amusement centre
containing a number of different concessions with pinball machines and other
devices that might or might not be legal. I sell my amusement centre to you
knowing that the police plan to raid the establishment and close many parts of
it down.16 I own a rubbish collection business and sell it to you knowing that
there is a strong possibility that the city will let a contract for the rubbish
collection and render the business superfluous.17
US Courts have reached different decisions in these cases, but for our
purposes what is noteworthy is that none of the information that is being kept
secret goes to the attributes of the goods. One of the parties is getting a bad
bargain not because the goods themselves are bad or anything other than what
they appear to be, but rather because the opportunity the contract makes
possible is not as rosy as it seems. Sellers may have secrets about their goods,
but in a world in which the goods must pass without objection in the trade and
be suitable for the purposes for which the buyer intends them, those inclined
to sharp practice are not likely to make much money by remaining silent about
product attributes, at least not in comparison to other information that they
possess.
The gap that Article 23’s disclosure rule fills may be small, but this is not to
say that it does not exist at all. To give one example, buyers may be left in the
dark about a critical attribute of the goods when the sellers in a particular
industry are jointly better off if a characteristic of their product remains a
secret. None of them may have an incentive to disclose the information, even
though buyers as a group would be better off if they did. Consider the
following hypothetical. A new machine has come to market. Precisely because
it uses cutting-edge technology, it can be kept running only ninety-five percent
of the time. The rest of the time it is down for maintenance. The seller provides
the maintenance, and the downtime is a necessary consequence of the new
technology. Every buyer needs to trade off the advantages of the new
technology against the greater difficulties of using it. The information is
relevant for the buyer because if she possessed this information she might not
14. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Great American Ins. Co., 49 Cal.4th 739, 234 P.3d
490 (Cal. 2010).
15. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817).
16. Dyke v. Zaiser, 80 Cal.App.2d 639, 182 P.2d 344 (Cal. App. 1947).
17. Jappe v. Mandt, 130 Cal. App.2d 426, 278 P.2d 940 (Cal. App. 1955).
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invest in the new machine at all. She might continue to use her existing
processes until the technology improved.
A disclosure duty may have traction in this case. The seller’s silence about
a characteristic of the machine is relevant to the buyer’s decision to purchase.
The machine is imperfect in the sense that it does not work 100 percent of the
time, but it is not defective. Someone who sells such a machine has broken no
implied warranty. The machines are as good as anyone else’s and as reliable as
it can be given the state of the technology. Notwithstanding the downtime, they
pass without objection in the trade.
If the buyer asks about downtime, the seller is obliged to reveal it. But it may
be that only sophisticated buyers ask. The imposition of this duty seems to
level the playing field. And it is information that the forces of competition
would not otherwise bring forward. Other manufacturers will not reveal it, as
their machines suffer from the same problem.
Other products possess attributes about which some buyers may be ignorant
and that the sellers have no interest in volunteering. I sell you ground beef or
some other processed meat to which I have added lean finely textured beef
(“LFTB”). The forces of competition may not be sufficient for it to be brought
to your attention. Other sellers may also use LFTB and share my reticence.
Those that do not use it may prefer to extol the virtues of their own goods
rather than disparaging those of others. You would not have bought ground
beef from me had you known that I have used this filler, but you did not and
you did not know to ask.
The tougher the background rules are that govern the sale of goods and the
more broadly one conceives the implied warranty of merchantability, the less
need there is for disclosure. Some jurisdictions, such as Great Britain, prohibit
the use of LFTB altogether. The more a jurisdiction regulates what can be sold,
the less there will be that can take buyers by surprise. In an environment in
which the bar for goods to pass without objection is low, the disclosure
requirement has a larger role to play. The two legal rules are perhaps best seen
as substitutes rather than as complements. In any event, a disclosure rule
provides some benefits. Against whatever benefits do exist, however, one has
to discover whether there are costs. One such cost is the possibility that the
disclosure requirement will force the seller to reveal information that is
sensibly kept secret.
3.

Product characteristics and trade secrets

Most critiques of mandatory disclosure begin with the observation that
disclosure obligations can distort the incentives of the seller to produce
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information in the first place.18 It might seem that information about the major
characteristics of a product one is selling is not likely to produce such
problems. Indeed, much information about a product that I sell is of use only
to someone who actually buys the product and tries to use it. To start my
machine, two buttons need to be pressed in sequence, first the blue button and
then the green one. I have no reason to withhold such information. It is of no
use to anyone except a buyer of the machine, and the buyer has no particular
need for it before she buys the machine and no value to her unless she buys it.
Nevertheless, there remains information about a product that a seller will be
reluctant to disclose, and this information is especially likely to exist when the
contract is between two merchants. Product characteristics may themselves be
proprietary information. A seller of chemical supplies might test many
different suppliers before finding one that meets the purity standards that its
buyers demand. The seller then repackages these chemicals. The buyers are
paying the seller a premium because of the effort the seller has expended in
finding potential sources of supply and testing them. The seller loses the
ability to recover this investment if she is forced to disclose the source of her
chemicals when she sells them.
Information about one’s sources is a standard example of what trade secret
law vigorously protects.19 If we force a seller who is adept at finding great
product sources to reveal them, we take away from her the incentive to find
them in the first instance. Similarly, we do not require merchants who bargain
with each other to reveal their reservation price. Mutually beneficial trade may
itself depend on each party not being completely sure about what the other
knows. Indeed, in the limit, when each party knows exactly what the other
does, trade is impossible.20
It would not seem that a sensible interpretation of the CESL would require
such disclosures. Product sources may not count as “characteristics” of the
product. Moreover, disclosing them is not consistent with “good commercial
practice,” but it should be pointed out that three of the benchmarks for
assessing whether information about a product should be disclosed – the
expertise of the seller, the importance of the information to the buyer, and the
ability of the buyer to acquire it by other means – weigh in favour of
disclosure, rather than against it.
More important is the question whether a court is well equipped to identify
information that sellers should be able to keep close to their chest. Consider
18. See Kronman, “Mistake, disclosure, information and the law of contracts”, 7 Journal of
Legal Studies (1978), 1–34.
19. See, e.g., Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 605 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
20. See Milgrom and Stokey, “Information, trade, and common knowledge”, 26 Journal of
Economic Theory (1982), 17–27.
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for example, the question whether Apple should be required to disclose
information about when a new product is going to be released. It is costless for
it to reveal the information, and buyers cannot discover it from other sources.
It is not hard to argue that a relevant characteristic of a product is whether it is
about to become out-of-date or that its price is about to fall dramatically. But
is requiring disclosure under such circumstances a good thing? Requiring
such disclosure will, among other things, affect a manufacturer’s incentives to
introduce new products in ways that are complicated and not obvious.
In industries in which products are rapidly evolving, sellers may include
features in their products that they do not want to reveal when they first sell
them. I sell you a machine to which a new component can be added when I
finish designing it. I do not want to announce my plans to introduce this
component (and thereby reveal my plans to my competitors) until I have the
component in hand. One of a machine’s characteristics is that it is built to
accommodate an additional component, and one can make an argument in
favour of such disclosure. Some buyers will buy another, perhaps more
expensive machine from me or someone else if they do not know about my
plans for the product I am selling them.
My own economic incentives will keep me from engaging in too much of
this. It is, after all, in my own interest to reveal to you all the things my product
does and might do. (Your ability to add the component will make you more
inclined to buy my machine in the first place. Hence, I have an incentive to
disclose it to you.) But we do in fact see sellers offering products with
characteristics they do not disclose under circumstance in which, if we do not
completely understand what is going on, advantage-taking does not seem to be
at work. The most obvious example is again from Apple. Apple does not
disclose the basic attributes (such as even the type of chip it is using) for the
iPad. And an iPhone or an iPad will sometimes include undisclosed hardware
that the current generation of software does not exploit.
One can argue that disclosure requirements do not tread on this territory and
that a sensible interpretation of Article 23 will read “main characteristics”
narrowly. But the more narrowly these are read, the less they will matter. In
asking whether concerns about proprietary information present a cost that
needs to be taken into account, two concerns seems most telling. First, one
needs to have some sense of how much proprietary information is embedded
in “information concerning the main characteristics of the goods.” Second,
one needs to possess some intuition about a court’s ability to identify such
information. Courts that are unable to do this risk either imposing a large cost
on sellers by requiring inappropriate disclosure or eviscerating the rule by
preventing disclosure even when it is useful.
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Understanding disclosures

The previous parts of this paper focused upon information that the seller, for
good reasons or bad, did not wish to disclose to the buyer. In this part, I focus
upon a different problem. Conveying information is inherently difficult.
Merely transferring information can be done at almost no cost. But a
disclosure obligation does no good unless the buyer for whom it is intended
understands the facts she is given. A seller could send an email to prospective
buyers attaching a huge text file that revealed all the characteristics of the
goods, but it may be next to useless.
Recall Borges’s The Library of Babel. The story centres on a library with an
infinite number of books in an infinite number of identical rooms. The library
contains every possible book, but almost all of the books are gibberish.
Among these countless volumes are the works of Shakespeare and Cervantes,
but without a catalogue, there is no way to find them. All the information one
wants is in the library, but there is no way to use it. Disclosure obligations may
do little more than create such a library. They are useless unless the seller is
obliged to package the information in a way that makes it accessible.21
We have witnessed a proliferation of disclosure rules in the United States
over the past half-century. These rules, in the main, have been a spectacular,
albeit well-intentioned failure.22 Not only have they imposed substantial costs
and given rise to misplaced liability, but they have rarely done much good. It
turns out to be hard to make particular information salient, without making
some other piece of important information less salient. Valuable information
rarely has a discrete yes-no, on-off character that can be easily and readily
conveyed. This is especially likely with respect to information about goods
that already pass without objection in the trade and that are already suitable for
whatever purposes the buyer has disclosed to the seller. What the buyer needs
to know under such circumstances is not in plain sight.
We want the seller to package the information in such a way that it gives the
buyer what she needs. This requires considerable sorting and editing. Doing
this is costly. Moreover, disclosing one piece of information and giving it
prominence necessarily means giving less prominence to something else or
omitting it entirely. In practice, mandating disclosure may create a world in
which the legal system rather than the forces of the market are determining
what is disclosed. To justify disclosure requirements where it really matters,

21. See Craswell, “Taking information seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in
Contract Law and Elsewhere”, 92 Virginia Law Review (2006), 565–632.
22. See Ben-Shahar and Schneider, “The failure of mandated disclosure”, 159 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (2011), 647–749.
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one needs to show not only that the market is imperfect (which is easy), but
also that it is less imperfect than a court (which is hard).
It may be comparatively easy for the seller to convey the information that
her buyer wants. But this is not the information that we care about. If the buyer
knows the information she needs, she can ask for it. It is only with respect to
information for which the buyer does not know how to ask that a rule
mandating disclosure matters.
It might seem that merchant buyers, as opposed to consumers, would be
well equipped to sort through the information they are given and isolate what
is of importance to them. What matters is that they possess the information,
not the particular form it takes. But here one must return to the question of the
problem that the disclosure obligation is solving. Sophisticated buyers do not
need the rule to protect them. They know what information they need.
Disclosure mandates are aimed at buyers who are less sophisticated. They do
not know exactly what to ask for or what they will find relevant.
Tailoring the disclosure matters, precisely because the buyer being
protected does not know what she does not know. To return to the example of
lean finely textured beef, it is not obvious that a buyer would understand that
the meat product they were buying contained LFTB even if this fact were
listed along with any number of other product attributes. For it to register with
buyers, it needs to stand out. Buyers would, for example, take note if the seller
were required to disclose the existence of LFTB by its other name (“pink
slime”). But a seller under a general disclosure mandate cannot easily tell what
needs to be said nor how to say it.
Disclosure obligations are especially difficult in the environment in which
the CESL is intended to operate. Disclosure is easiest when buyer and seller
speak the same language. The word “chicken” means the same thing to both.23
But the CESL is designed to work across jurisdictions. There is a greater
likelihood that they do not share a common understanding of commercial
conventions. Unless they share a common understanding of what words mean
it is not easy to communicate even when everyone has the best of motives, and
this legal rule is premised upon its ability to work effectively when some do
not. Beef that includes LFTB still consists of nothing but beef. Some
merchants might understand that a label that described the product as “one
hundred percent beef ” might include LFTB, but others might not. When and
under what circumstances is a seller required to explain such things?

23. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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Industry groups can also do work here.24 They can establish conventions for
a two-by-four piece of lumber.25 But the disclosure requirement embedded in
a commercial law cannot work in this fashion. It is based on a standard, rather
than a rule. It obliges the seller to disclose, but, by its nature, it cannot
prescribe the form of the disclosure. Its contours are set only when a judge
applies it. It is hard for a seller and a buyer to speak a common language when
none exists.
When a strong need for a common metric exists, regulation can provide it.
Instead of merely requiring car manufacturers to disclose the fuel efficiency of
their cars, we require them to express their fuel efficiency in a prescribed way.
While we can debate whether the existing measure, which focuses on miles
per gallon in the highway and the city, facilitates comparison shopping and
enables the buyers to make intelligent decisions, this sort of mandatory
disclosure at least has the virtue of being uniform across sellers. Moreover,
when regulators design the rules, they can readily pick and choose among
what attributes are disclosed. They do not have to fear legal liability if they
omit something in the interest of making other information more salient.26
5.

Conclusion

None of this is to say that Article 23 is necessarily bad. In the vast majority of
cases, it may be relatively toothless. It will induce relatively little additional
disclosure, and the case in which it trips up a merchant who engages in an
ordinary commercial practice is likely to arise only rarely. Precisely because
Article 23 lacks hard contours, it may be hard to bring a case under it and show
meaningful damages. Indeed, the effect of the rule may lie not in the value of
the new information that is communicated as a result of the rule, but rather the
legal consequences that attach to the marginal information that is disclosed.
The disclosure requirement works in conjunction with the rule that requires
any description of the goods to serve as a warranty. In the absence of the
disclosure rule, a seller can sell a laptop computer and remain silent about the
battery. Buyers would be able to complain (and the seller would only be liable)
if the battery failed to pass without objection in the trade. But if the battery-life
24. See, e.g., Bernstein, “Private commercial law in the cotton industry: Creating
cooperation through rules, norms, and institutions”, 99 Michigan Law Review (2001),
1724–1790.
25. The dimensions of a two-by-four are 1.5 in. by 3.5 in. These are set by the American
Lumber Standard Committee. Its members are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. See
<www.alsc.org/geninfo_history_mod.htm> (last visited 24 Aug. 2012).
26. See “Proposed Label Designs for a Range of Vehicle Technologies”, at <www.
epa.gov/fueleconomy/label/420f10049.pdf> (last visited 24 Aug. 2012).

310

Baird

CML Rev. 2013 SI

of a laptop is a main characteristic of the laptop, then the seller must disclose
the battery life and be liable if it proves to be somewhat less.
The effect of the disclosure rule in this environment is to ensure that a
product is bundled with a warranty with respect to its main characteristics.
Article 23 then serves less as a rule that conveys information than as a
mandatory warranty. The rule has traction not so much because the buyer
cares about the information that I provide, but rather that, in the course of
providing the information, I necessarily give a warranty at the same time. A
disclosure rule has this effect regardless of whether the information is useful
to the buyer or whether the buyer even notices it.
Requiring goods to be sold with broader warranties is not likely to prove
especially costly, given the ability of the seller to qualify and hedge in their
descriptions. But it suggests that the drafters might have started in a different
place. Instead of linking warranties with disclosures and then mandating
disclosures, one might have asked what information buyers were likely to need
and how to shape legal rules in a way that best ensured that this information
was conveyed. A regime that requires disclosure and makes the seller liable for
anything disclosed may leave buyers not only worse off, but also with less
information than a regime that did neither. Under a regime like that of the
CESL, I may believe that my laptop’s battery lasts for six hours, but I may be
reluctant to say this, given that I shall be held liable if it turns out not to be true.
I may say instead that it has a four-hour life (or at least a four-hour life) or add
other qualifications that have the effect of limiting my liability. My buyer
might be better served if I were free to say what I really thought.
Ironically, a regime of mandatory disclosure and attached warranties to
representations might lead to less information and less useful information
than a regime of caveat emptor. Buyers might be better off if their seller
conveyed whatever information she wanted in whatever form as a result of
market pressures rather than face a seller who transmitted information
because of legal compulsion.
Upon reaching such a conclusion, it is a commonplace to observe that the
trade-off depends upon empirical study. Less often observed, though
nevertheless true, is that rarely will the results of any empirical study change
anyone’s mind. Most policymakers and academics begin their careers with
strongly held views about how much the forces of the marketplace constrain
the merchants who operate within it. These starting positions tend to shape
decisively attitudes towards rules such as Article 23.

